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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Given the extraordinary scope of the current economic crisis, no single policy can fully address 
the challenge of job creation. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act has spurred job creation 
substantially, but the deterioration in economic prospects since it was passed demands a renewed focus 
on job growth in the near term. 
A well-designed temporary federal job creation tax credit should be an integral part of the effort to boost 
job growth. Besides having broad-based, bipartisan political support, the best argument for a job creation 
tax credit is simply that it will create almost 3 million jobs in 2010 and over 2 million in 2011. Moreover, it 
will stimulate the entrepreneurial character of Americans by giving 6.5 million employers and millions 
more aspiring entrepreneurs a limited-time offer to expand their production or start new endeavors, at a 
discount. Because choices about whom to hire and what work they should do are left to independent 
decision makers who can act immediately, the credit will have just as quick an impact. 
This paper outlines a version of this credit that aims to induce increases in payroll—either through adding 
new jobs or by increasing the hours or wages of current workers—and estimates its economic impact: 
• A job creation tax credit that refunded 15% of new wage costs in 2010 and 10% of new wage costs in 
2011 could create 5.1 million additional jobs in the U.S. economy over these two years. 
• The net cost of the tax credit would be roughly $27 billion, or about $5,400 per new full-time-equivalent 
job created over these two years. 
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 A well-designed temporary federal job creation tax 
credit should be an integral part of the effort to boost job 
growth.1 Besides having broad-based, bipartisan political 
support, the best argument for a job creation tax credit 
is simply that it will create almost 3 million jobs in 2010 
and over 2 million in 2011. Moreover, it will stimulate 
the entrepreneurial character of Americans by giving 6.5 
million employers and millions more aspiring entrepre-
neurs a limited-time offer to expand their production or 
start new endeavors, at a discount. Because choices about 
whom to hire and what work they should do are left to 
independent decision makers who can act immediately, 
the credit will have just as quick an impact.
 This paper outlines a version of this credit that aims 
to induce increases in payroll—either through adding new 
jobs or by increasing the hours or wages of current work-
ers—and estimates its economic impact:
•	 A	job	creation	tax	credit	that	refunded	15%	of	new	
wage	 costs	 in	2010	 and	10%	of	new	wage	 costs	 in	
2011 could create 5.1 million additional jobs in the 
U.S. economy over these two years. 
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•	 The	net	cost	of	the	tax	credit	would	be	roughly	$27	billion,	or	about	$5,400	per	new	full-time-equivalent	job	created	
over these two years. 
Why more jobs are needed in 2010 and 2011
The recession now under way is more severe than any since 1929. The collapse of the housing bubble and the financial 
panic of 2008 delivered a more intensive shock to the economy than the busts that initiated the Great Depression in 
1929.	In	just	12	months	from	December	2007	to	December	2008,	household	wealth	fell	17%—five	times	the	rate	of	
decline during 1929. For months it seemed not unlikely that even industry leaders like General Electric and Chesapeake 
Energy might default on their debt. Expecting a decline in demand and limited access to credit, businesses raised cash by 
ruthlessly cutting their work forces, reducing inventory, and postponing planned expansions. Only massive government 
intervention—the reduction of short-term interest rates almost to zero, innovative quantitative easing programs (Federal 
Reserve policies to free up credit that go beyond ordinary monetary policy), and big increases in government spending 
—prevented the economy from spiraling down into a great depression.
 Yet the recession has been much deeper than what was forecast when the planning for these efforts took place at the 
end	of	2008	and	early	2009.	From	the	beginning	of	the	recession	in	December	2007	until	September	2009,	the	latest	
month	of	data,	the	employment-to-population	ratio	for	persons	16	and	over	in	the	United	States	fell	from	62.7%	to	
58.8%.	Further,	total	hours	worked	in	the	private	economy	have	fallen	8.6%	as	8.0	million	workers	have	lost	their	jobs	
and	another	4.5	million	have	been	forced	to	take	part-time	work	because	full-time	work	is	not	available.	
 Even if a recovery in economic output is already under way or will be soon, the employment-to-population ratio is 
unlikely	to	return	to	its	December	2007	level	for	several	years.	In	the	past	two	recessions	(1990-91	and	2001),	the	employ-
ment-to-population ratio did not increase from its lowest level by any significant extent for at least two years. Economists 
surveyed in September 2009 remain mostly pessimistic about the prospects of a strong rebound for jobs—they forecast 
nonfarm	payroll	growth	of	only	17,000	jobs	a	month	over	the	next	year.	To	put	this	number	in	context,	more	than	125,000	
jobs are needed each month just to keep the unemployment rate from rising (Bernstein and Mishel 2008). 
	 Today	the	Congressional	Budget	Office	projects	an	unemployment	rate	of	10.2%	in	2010,	9.1%	in	2011,	and	7.3%	
in 2012. In other words, in three years the unemployment rate will be about where it was in the middle of the recession.
Clearly,	job	creation	should	be	a	top	priority	of	policy	makers	right	now,	and	a	job	creation	tax	credit	is	an	efficient	and	
effective policy option. 
Design and implementation of the job creation tax credit
The job creation tax credit would be a refundable tax credit available to employers who expand the portion of their pay-
roll that is subject to Social Security tax in 2010 and 2011. 
What is the amount of the credit?
The	tax	credit	would	equal	15%	of	additions	to	taxable	payroll	in	2010	and	10%	in	2011.	The	reduction	in	the	second	
year is a response to two assumptions. First, improved employment conditions in 2011 will reduce the need for the 
credit. Second, as conditions improve employers who would have expanded in the absence of the credit will still be able 
to take advantage of it, so reducing the second year credit helps control its cost. Moreover, the higher credit in 2010 
encourages employers to front-load their hires.
What is the credit based on?
The credit is paid on increases in total payroll subject to Social Security taxes. So firms could receive the credit for adding 
new jobs, adding hours for existing workers, or simply raising pay. 
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 Further, because the credit is based only on that portion of payroll subject to Social Security taxes, wage increases 
given	to	very	highly	paid	workers	(those	whose	earnings	exceed	the	Social	Security	tax	threshold	of	$106,800	in	2009)	
would not be eligible for the credit. 
What is the base period to which payrolls in 2010 and 2011 will be compared?
The credit would be provided for any payroll expansions (not just new hires, as mentioned above) in a quarter relative 
to the same quarter a year ago. The credit could be claimed for payroll expansions relative to the base period starting in 
the first quarter of calendar year 2010. At the end of March 2010, employers would receive a tentative quarterly jobs 
credit based on how much their first quarter payroll exceeded their payroll during the first quarter of 2009. The tentative 
jobs credit for the second and third quarters of 2010 would be based on comparisons with the corresponding quarters 
of 2009. The tentative credit for the fourth quarter of 2010, however, would be based on a comparison with the fourth 
quarter of 2008. 
 The quarterly approach means that firms get their estimated jobs credit soon after paying their workers, thus provid-
ing relief for firms with cash flow problems. The approach also provides a natural way of handling the seasonal variation 
in employment levels. 
 The tentative amounts for each quarter and the actual amounts for the year would be reconciled based on the firm’s 
annual tax return.
 The plan avoids using the fourth quarter of 2009 because it is likely that Congress will be considering this proposal 
during that period and so firms might have an incentive to cut employment before the start of the credit. Also, because 
new jobs added during November and December 2009 will not raise the baseline employment and payroll numbers to 
which 2010 and 2011 will be compared, people hired during those months will give the firm a running start on expand-
ing their employment levels during the first quarter of 2010. 
Which employers will qualify?
Employment expansion should be encouraged in as many sectors of the economy as possible. A broadly based employ-
ment expansion provides a greater variety of job opportunities for the unemployed, and all employment expansions 
provide a boost to economic output and tax receipts. But for the credit to be broadly available it must be “refundable,” 
that is, available at full value even to businesses that have no corporate or personal income tax liability as well as to non-
profit organizations and state and local governments. 
 But any firm receiving the credit would need to be in a trade or business. This requirement means that families who 
directly employ nannies, tutors, housekeepers, and gardeners would not be eligible, but companies that provide land-
scaping, cooking, child care, and home health services would be.  
How can the credit be implemented quickly?
Almost	all	U.S.	employers	currently	file	Form	941	to	report	their	liabilities	for	Social	Security	and	Medicare	taxes	and	
income taxes withheld for their employees. Adding a few lines to the form would allow a wage credit to be implemented 
relatively simply and quickly. Appendix D provides a brief discussion of one possible design for a wage credit program 
using	Form	941.	
Economic impact of the credit
The costs and benefits of the job creation tax credit are summarized in Table 1. We estimate that in 2010, 2.8 million 
jobs	will	be	created	by	the	credit,	followed	by	2.3	million	in	2011.	The	net	budgetary	costs	of	the	program	are	$13	bil-
lion	in	2010	and	$14	billion	in	2011.
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	 The	remainder	of	this	section	walks	through	the	rows	of	Table	1	to	provide	a	summary	of	how	each	number	was	
calculated.	Full	details	on	the	economic	parameters	and	assumptions	that	generate	the	data	in	Table	1	are	provided	in	
the appendices. 
Row 1: Jobs created by the credit 
(2.8 million in 2010, 2.3 million in 2011)
The	economic	literature	finds	that	a	1%	decline	in	labor	costs	is	associated	with	a	0.3%	increase	in	demand	for	new	
hours by employers. (This is based on the authoritative book by economist Dan Hamermesh, Labor Demand). Only 
those employers who add to payrolls (whether in the form of new jobs or added hours or raises for current employees) 
will be able to take advantage of the credit, and data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indicate that just 
over	60%	of	employment	is	in	firms	that	are	likely	to	do	so.	(See	Appendix	H	for	more	information.)	Even	in	a	troubled	
economy, there is a wide diversity of growth and contraction among employers, and many employers will be in a position 
where the credit offers a meaningful incentive. 
	 Given	these	assumptions,	the	percentage	increase	in	payrolls	spurred	by	the	credit	can	be	calculated	as:	60%	(share	
of	employment	utilizing	the	credit)	multiplied	by	15%	(the	size	of	the	tax	credit)	multiplied	by	0.3	(the	best	estimate	of	
Table 1
economic costs and benefits of a job creation tax credit
2010 2011
(1) Number of jobs induced by the credit (thousands) 2,840 2,256
(2) Number of credited jobs not induced by the credit (thousands) 13,163 18,428
 
(3) Cost of credits for jobs induced by the credit (millions) $18,252 $9,669
(4) Cost of credits for jobs not induced by the credit (millions) 83,520 77,952
(5) Corporate and personal tax revenue gained from non-induced jobs 
(millions)
21,933 20,471
(6) Gross cost of the credit (Row 3 + Row 4 - Row 5, millions) $79,839 $67,150
(7) Increase in GDP induced by the credit (millions) $175,310 $139,298
(8) Effect of rising GDP on the budget deficit (millions) -66,618 -52,933
(9) Estimated rise in revenue from the credit (millions) $51,629 $41,023
(10) Net revenue costs of the credit (millions) 28,211 26,127
(11) Estimated reduction in spending from the credit (millions) $-14,989 $-11,910
(12) Net fiscal costs of the credit (Row 6 - Row 9 + Row 11, millions) 13,222 14,217
(13) Net fiscal cost of the credit per job created (Row 12/Row 1) $4,656 $6,301
SouRcE: Authors’ analysis, using data sources and methods as described in the text.
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the	responsiveness	of	employer	hiring	to	a	1%	change	in	labor	costs),	or	a	2.7%	increase	in	the	economy’s	total	payroll.	
A	payroll	increase	of	2.7%	represents	a	roughly	$175	billion	increase	in	total	labor	compensation.	Given	that	the	average	
full-time	equivalent	employee	earns	$62,000	in	compensation,	this	translates	into	roughly	2.8	million	additional	jobs	
for that year. Doing the same exercise for 2011 yields 2.3 million jobs in that year. Note that we calculate the change 
in full-time equivalent jobs. Because the average hours worked per week in the U.S. economy are less than a full-time 
equivalent, the actual number of new jobs would be greater.
Row 2: Jobs receiving the credit that likely would have been created anyway 
(13.2 million in 2010 and 18.4 million in 2011)
Data from the business employment dynamics (BEDS) program of the BLS show that expanding private-sector es-
tablishments	experience	employment	gains	that	are	equal	to	roughly	10.6%	of	total	economy-wide	employment	in	a	
given year. We use this as our measure of new jobs that would receive the credit that would have been created even in its 
absence. So, in 2010 roughly 13.2 million jobs are projected to receive the credit that would have been created anyway. 
This number is larger over the two-year period ending in 2011.
Row 3: cost of credit for jobs induced by the credit
($18 billion in 2010 and $10 billion in 2011)
If the 2.8 million jobs induced by the credit in 2010 pay the economy-wide average annual wage covered by Social 
Security	of	$43,000,	then	the	wage	credits	for	these	jobs	will	cost	$18	billion	in	that	year.	A	similar	calculation	yields	
$10	billion	in	2011.	
Row 4: cost of credit for jobs not induced by the credit
($84 billion in 2010 and $78 billion in 2011)
If the 13.2 million jobs that receive the credit in 2010 that would have been created even in its absence pay the economy-
wide	average	annual	wage	of	$43,000,	then	the	credit	for	these	jobs	will	cost	$84	billion	in	that	year.	A	similar	calculation	
yields	$78	billion	in	2011.	
Row 5: Profits tax revenue gained by crediting jobs not induced by the credit
($22 billion in 2010 and $20 billion in 2011)
For firms that receive the credit for new jobs that would have been created anyway, the tax credit then directly increases 
business	profits,	and	this	increase	in	profits	would	be	taxed.	We	assume	that	the	statutory	corporate	profit	tax	rate	of	35%	
and	the	non-corporate	profit	tax	rate	of	27%	apply	to	the	private	sector,	for-profit	employers	whose	profits	increase	as	a	
result	of	the	credit.	The	increase	in	profits	of	these	employers	results	in	roughly	$22	billion	in	additional	revenue	gener-
ated	through	corporate	(and	non-corporate)	income	taxes	in	2010	and	$20	billion	in	2011.	
Row 6: Gross cost of the credit
($80 billion in 2010 and $67 billion in 2011)
Adding up (1) the cost of jobs induced by the credit and (2) the cost of providing a credit to those jobs not induced 
by the credit, then subtracting (3) the offset provided by the direct increase in employer incomes that the credit makes 
possible on those jobs that would have been created anyway yields the gross cost of the credit (i.e., the cost before taking 
into account the offsets created by the job growth that it spurs). 
	 This	means	that	the	cost	of	the	credit	for	jobs	that	would	have	been	created	even	without	the	credit	is	$62	billion	
($84	billion	minus	$22	billion).	To	this,	we	add	the	$18	billion	cost	of	the	2.8	million	jobs	directly	created	by	the	credit,	
leaving	us	with	an	$80	billion	gross	cost	in	2010.
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Row 7: GDP effect of the credit 
($175 billion in 2010 and $139 billion in 2011)
The gross cost of the credit identified above will be substantially offset by the economic activity (i.e., employment) that 
the credit spurs. Assuming that each new job created generates an addition to overall GDP that is equal to the economy-
wide	average	 in	 labor	 compensation	 ($62,000),	 the	2.8	million	 jobs	 created	by	 the	credit	will	boost	gross	domestic	
product	by	$175	billion	in	2010.	
Row 8: Effect of rising GDP on budget deficit
($67 billion in 2010 and $53 billion in 2011)
Data	from	the	Congressional	Budget	Office	(CBO)	indicate	that	every	dollar	increase	in	GDP	reduces	the	budget	deficit	
by 38 cents. Rising GDP results in both increased revenues for the government as income is taxed as well as reductions 
in	the	need	for	safety	net	spending	as	more	people	find	sustaining	work.	The	$175	billion	increase	in	GDP	spurred	by	
the	credit	thus	translates	into	a	$67	billion	decrease	in	the	budget	deficit	in	2010	and	a	$53	billion	decrease	in	2011.
Row 9: Revenue increases from net new jobs created
($52 billion in 2010 and $41 billion in 2011)
Of this decline in the deficit, data from CBO indicate that roughly three-quarters of it results from an increase in rev-
enues.	This	implies	that	the	credit	will	increase	revenues	by	$52	billion	in	2010	and	$41	billion	in	2011.
Row 10: Net federal revenue costs of the credit
($28 billion in 2010 and $26 billion in 2011)
In 2010, the additional federal revenue spurred by the job credit from its effect on overall GDP means that the credit’s 
net	revenue	costs	are	knocked	down	to	$28	billion	in	2010	and	$26	billion	in	2011.
Row 11: Spending reductions from net new jobs created
($15 billion in 2010 and $12 billion in 2011)
In	2010,	another	$15	billion	in	deficit	reduction	will	occur	due	to	reduced	need	for	safety	net	spending	as	the	result	of	
higher	employment	and	GDP.	These	spending	reductions	will	reduce	the	deficit	by	$12	billion	in	2011.	
Row 12: Net fiscal costs of the credit
($13 billion in 2010 and $14 billion in 2011)
Subtracting	these	spending	reductions	from	the	net	revenue	costs	yields	the	net	fiscal	costs	of	the	credit:	$13	billion	in	
2010	and	$14	billion	in	2011.
Row 13: Net fiscal cost of the credit per new job created
($4,700 in 2010 and $6,300 in 2011)
Dividing this net fiscal cost by the number of new jobs created means that each new job created by the credit costs 
$4,700	in	2010	and	$6,300	in	2011.
Conclusion
While	the	official	trough	of	the	longest	recession	since	World	War	II	may	be	here	or	near,	it	is	clear	that	conditions	
in	the	labor	market	will	be	dire	for	years.	The	CBO	has	forecast	that	not	until	2014	will	the	economy	return	to	the	
pre-recession	unemployment	rate	of	4.7%.	Why	would	we	accept	this?	Policy	makers	must	make	robust	job	growth	
a top priority.
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 The job creation tax credit can boost us out of this recession quickly and at a modest cost. It empowers 6.5 million 
employers to take the expansion plans they put on the shelf in November 2008 and start implementing them as soon 
as January. 
 The credit should be a key part of the policy mix if for no other reason than that it is especially effective when compared 
to other tax breaks offered to business in the name of job creation. Its effectiveness stems from its straightforward design: 
businesses only get the credit if they increase their payrolls, either through adding jobs, adding hours, or raising wages. Its 
effectiveness also makes its net costs cheap. In short, it belongs in a legislative effort in the near term to create jobs.
—Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Mich.
—John H. Bishop is associate professor of Human Resource Studies at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
appendix a:  
Common questions asked  
about the job creation tax credit
A	number	of	questions/criticisms	have	been	raised	about	the	issue	of	a	job	creation	tax	credit	(JCTC)	and	job	creation.	
We address some of them in this appendix.
 
Given the current economy, why will firms expand in response to this program? 
While it is true that the roots of current labor market woes run deep, it remains the case that, even in a depressed 
economy, employers face a variety of economic situations; some employers will expand in response to a marginal cut in 
the	cost	of	hiring.	Standard	economic	logic	about	marginal	decision	making	says	that	the	JCTC	will	tip	many	decisions	
in the direction of more hiring. That is what the many econometric studies of the constant output demand for labor 
reviewed and summarized by Daniel Hamermesh demonstrate.
	 Let’s	start	with	the	effect	of	the	JCTC	on	the	cash	flow	of	firms	that,	despite	the	recession,	boosted	sales	and	employ-
ment	enough	to	allow	them	to	take	advantage	of	the	refundable	job	credit.	The	JCTC	has	both	income	and	substitution	
effects. The income effect is a targeted reward (a quarterly rebate that quickly supplements cash flow) of companies that 
increase	their	payroll	above	the	level	that	prevailed	in	FY2009.	Firms	that	have	sufficient	demand	for	their	output	but	
face	difficulty	getting	working	capital	from	their	banks	are	quickly	assisted	when	they	increase	hours	and	employment.	
By	expanding	at	a	time	of	10%	unemployment,	these	employers	pursued	risky	expansions	in	troubled	times	that	created	
substantial positive externalities for fellow citizens. For this we should be grateful rather than worried about the reward 
they	receive	from	the	JCTC.	
	 The	JCTC-induced	increase	in	jobs	and	payroll	will	tend	to	increase	demand	for	output.	The	increased	cash	flow	
to firms, even those that were not induced into hiring by the credit, will also generate income effects. Mark Zandi, a 
macroeconomist at Moody’s Economy.com, has estimated that a broad-based payroll tax “holiday” has high “bang-for-
buck” even graded strictly as macroeconomic stimulus when compared to many other policies aimed at shortening the 
recession.	The	JCTC	is	similar	(though	not	identical)	to	a	payroll	tax	holiday	and	should	have	similarly	good	properties	
simply as macroeconomic stimulus to demand. The Keynesian demand effect thus tends to validate the expansion plans 
the	JCTC’s	incentive	effects	generate.
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consumers have decided they must stop spending beyond their means. How can reductions in the 
marginal cost of labor solve a problem of insufficient aggregate demand by domestic customers? 
There are a number of channels through which lowering the marginal cost of labor may help spur aggregate demand. 
Specifically, reductions in the marginal cost of American labor and output will:
•  Increase exports—Demand is growing rapidly in emerging economies. American exporters become more competi-
tive because they can give temporary discounts to close a deal. The fact that discounts will disappear in 2012 may 
aid the exporter in closing the deal. Buy our locomotive (or industrial crane or combined cycle generator) now while 
it is on sale. 
•		 Reduce imports and offshoring—Prices of domestically produced goods and services will fall relative to import 
prices. This will increase the U.S. produced share of value-added in final demand, creating more jobs or longer work 
hours for domestic workers. Firms may also choose to postpone offshore outsourcing. The postponement may con-
tinue	after	the	JCTC	expires	as	emerging	market	currencies	rise	against	the	dollar	and	wages	of	English	speakers	in	
emerging economies rise. 
•		 Raise service quality—Some firms will try to attract customers by improving the quality of services they offer (gen-
erally in ways not measured by the BLS). Firms might, for example, shorten wait times or improve the training of 
sales staff so that they can better assist customers. 
•		 Push down prices and raise domestic demand by cutting labor costs—A	temporary	15%	reduction	in	the	marginal	
wage-and-salary cost of labor throughout much of the economy will temporarily reduce prices of the goods and services 
these	workers	provide.	Bishop	and	Havemen	(1979)	and	Bishop	(1981)	concluded	that	the	1977-78	new	jobs	tax	
credit	(NJTC)	lowered	retail	inflation.	Sales	and	promotions	offering	introductory	rates	for	ongoing	services	are	likely	
to	become	more	aggressive.	Despite	the	problem	of	insufficient	aggregate	demand,	the	temporary	two-year	reduction	
in	prices	will	increase	real	sales	and	output	and	help	validate	the	increase	in	employment	stimulated	by	the	JCTC.	
The freeze of financial markets last fall destroyed business confidence and led to big cuts in 
employment and capital investment. Short-term interest rates are close to zero, so the Fed has 
run out of ammunition for stimulating investment demand. Is it realistic to hope that the JcTc will 
help reverse the pervasive pessimism that is undermining employer confidence that investing in 
new products and services will be profitable? 
We	think	there	are	several	reasons	to	think	that	a	JCTC	can	help	increase	employers’	confidence	that	expanding	employ-
ment will pay off.
•		 Investments are labor intensive during the research, development, and construction phase—Firms that repair 
roads or build new capital equipment typically expand staff when they win the contract and so will benefit  from the 
JCTC.	R&D	is	also	a	people-intensive	activity	that	is	often	contracted	out	to	specialized	firms	that	might	receive	the	
JCTC	when	they	win	a	contract.	The	subsidy	provided	by	the	JCTC	will	lower	the	cost	of	contracting	with	R&D	
and construction contractors and this should stimulate these activities. 
•		 The JCTC rewards investments in people—Most of the costs of in-house training are the time of the workers be-
ing	trained.	Companies	qualifying	for	a	JCTC	subsidy	can	receive	even	larger	rebates	when	workers	spend	more	time	
in training.
•		 The JCTC underwrites expansion into new markets—Expanding into new markets is also a risky, people-inten-
sive	way	of	growing	a	company	(e.g.,	recruiting	sales	personnel	in	unserved	markets).	A	temporary	JCTC	says,	do	
the expansion now while the talented workers are available and generate a tax credit for yourself in their first year.
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	 	 In	effect,	the	JCTC	puts	investments	in	the	company’s	future	on	sale	for	two	years.	This	is	a	backdoor	way	of	
trying to fix a capital market that is unable to stimulate enough investment to soak up the savings that households 
are trying to put away. The labor costs of undertaking these investments will be much lower during 2010 and 2011 
than they will be in 2012 or 2013. It essentially provides a signal telling firms, “Don’t wait until the economy comes 
roaring	back.	Start	now,	hire	the	talented	people	you	could	not	attract	in	2007	and	get	a	jump	on	your	competi-
tion.”
  Having talented people is what creates long-run sustainable advantage for small firms. Hopefully, competitors 
will	realize	that	a	firm	using	the	JCTC	is	stealing	a	march	on	them	and	so	they	will	rush	to	try	to	do	the	same,	
thereby restoring the economy’s animal spirits (Akerlof and Schiller 2009).
	 	 Again,	a	JCTC	should	not	be	the	only	policy	enacted	to	spur	job	growth	in	the	near	term—it	should	be	supple-
mented by other measures to boost demand. But, to the extent that this incentivizes employers to add jobs and/or 
relieves credit constraints that are keeping some employers from expanding employment as much as they’d like, it 
could make a real contribution to job growth. 
appendix b:  
The 1977-78 new jobs tax credit (nJTC)
Tax	credits	for	new	jobs	have	been	tried	before,	and	they	worked	well.	A	“new	jobs	tax	credit”	(NJTC)	was	passed	by	
Congress	and	went	into	effect	for	1977	and	1978.	It	provided	a	credit	to	reduce	tax	liabilities	of	for-profit	businesses	that	
expanded	payroll	and	employment.	In	today’s	dollars,	the	tax	credit	amounted	to	around	$7,000	per	new	hire,	which	was	
roughly	14%	of	average	U.S.	wages	and	salaries	for	full-time	employees.	The	credit	was	capped	by	not	letting	businesses	
claim	the	credit	for	more	than	48	additional	employees.	
	 In	1976,	the	second	year	of	expansion	coming	out	of	the	1974	recession,	growth	had	slowed	to	an	anemic	2.9%	
for	employment	and	3.1%	for	output.	During	the	subsequent	two-year	period	during	which	NJTC	was	in	operation,	
private	employment	rose	11.1%	(a	record	for	the	past	50	years).	The	two-year	percentage	increase	in	the	employment-
population	ratio	and	in	total	hours	worked	in	the	non-farm	economy	(10.9	%)	are	also	records	for	the	past	50	years.	
By	the	final	quarter	of	1978,	capacity	utilization	had	spiked,	real	output	had	increased	15%,	and	unemployment	had	
dropped	from	7.8%	to	5.9%.
		 Formal	evaluations	suggest	that	the	1977-78	NJTC	was	quite	successful,	creating	700,000	jobs	by	February	1978	
and	probably	many	more	by	December	1978	(Perloff	and	Wachter	1979;	Bartik	2001).	
	 These	evaluations	rely	in	part	on	surveys	showing	that	businesses	that	knew	about	the	NJTC	were	more	likely	to	
expand	than	businesses	that	did	not	know	about	the	NJTC.	In	addition,	industries	with	more	small	businesses,	which	
particularly	benefited	from	the	1977-78	NJTC,	increased	employment	more	in	the	two	years	than	industries	dominated	
by	large	firms	whose	participation	in	NJTC	was	capped	at	48	employees.	
	 Reviewing	this	literature,	Daniel	Hamermesh	concluded,	“The	evidence	on	the	effect	of	the	NJTC	on	employment	
growth is both positive and convincing. The number of jobs created and the total budgetary cost of creating them, are 
remarkably close to what would be predicted if one applied the best guess estimates of Chapter 3 to the particular incen-
tives	offered	by	the	NJTC”	(Hamermesh	1993,	192).
	 The	expiration	of	the	NJTC	at	the	end	of	1978	did	not	unravel	the	NJTC’s	employment-boosting	effects.	During	
the next 12 months, output and employment growth slowed down considerably but the unemployment rate was stable 
at its lower level and the employment-population ratio remained at its up-to-then record level.
	 Apparently,	the	temporary	character	of	the	NJTC	induced	some	employers	to	expand	now rather than later. When 
the subsidy ended, the new hires were retained and those who quit were replaced. Then the nation was hit by two oil 
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shocks (caused by the Iranian Revolution and the Iran/Iraq war) and a strong Federal Reserve response (the FRB dis-
count	rate	reached	13.42%	in	1981)	to	wring	inflationary	expectations	out	of	the	economy.	These	shocks	caused	the	
recessions in 1980 and 1982-83 (Hamilton 2003, 2009). 
	 The	1977-78	NJTC	had	two	flaws	that	reduced	both	its	scale	and	its	cost	effectiveness.	No	firm	could	claim	more	
than	$100,000	in	NJTC	credits	(effectively	48	employees).	The	other	flaw	was	that	the	threshold	for	calculating	the	
1978	NJTC	credit	was	102%	of	the	1977	FUTA	(Federal	Unemployment	Tax	Act)	tax	base.	That	meant	that	a	firm	
growing	rapidly	in	1977	was	also	raising	its	threshold	for	calculating	the	1978	credit.	This	discouraged	aggressive	expan-
sions	in	1977.	Both	of	these	flaws	have	been	avoided	in	our	proposed	design	for	the	2010-11	JCTC.	
appendix C:  
How do we know employers will respond  
to lower wage costs by hiring?
The work of Daniel Hamermesh (1993) remains the canonical source for estimates of the responsiveness (or elasticity) 
of employers’ demand for labor to changes in labor costs when aggregate output is held constant. After examining nearly 
100 studies published in refereed journals he concluded: “The absolute value of the constant output elasticity of demand 
for homogeneous labor at a typical firm and for the aggregate economy in the long run is probably bracketed by the 
interval	[0.15,	0.75],	with	0.30	being	a	good	best	guess”	(Hamermesh	1993,	135).	
	 This	implies	that	a	10%	reduction	in	labor	costs	will	lead	to	a	3%	increase	in	employment	and	hours	worked	in	the	
economy, even when overall economic output is held constant. He also reviewed studies that examined the timing of re-
sponses	and	concluded	that	most	of	the	employment	response	to	changes	in	labor	costs	occurs	“within	a	year”	(p.	294).2 
	 In	the	national	income	and	product	accounts	(NIPA)	data,	private-sector	wages	and	salaries	are	on	average	83%	
of the total costs of labor compensation. The difference is employer contributions for pensions, Social Security, and 
health	insurance.	Consequently,	a	JCTC	credit	that	is	15%	of	wages	and	salaries	will	on	average	be	12.45%	of	total	
labor	costs.	An	elasticity	of	demand	for	labor	of	0.30	then	implies	that	employment	will	increase	by	3.74%	at	the	firms	
that	have	either	kept	employment	levels	stable	or	have	found	a	way	to	grow	in	difficult	times	possibly	because	of	the	
prospect	of	the	JCTC	subsidy.	In	a	competitive	economy	like	ours,	many	firms	are	shrinking	employment	even	while	
other firms are expanding employment. Some firms that have suffered grievous sales declines (or have lost access to 
bank loans) will not see a path to growing their employment in 2010 by enough to exceed their FY2009 level and ob-
tain	a	JCTC	subsidy.	Our	analysis	of	the	BEDS	data	implies	that	38.5%	of	firms	(weighted	by	employment)	will	have	
a	lower	payroll	in	2010	than	in	FY2009	and	therefore	will	not	earn	a	JCTC	subsidy.	Since	only	the	subsidized	firms	
will	respond,	the	impact	of	the	JCTC	on	total	private-sector	and	state	and	local	employment	is	predicted	to	be	2.3%	
[i.e.,	3.74%	*	(1-0.385)].	
	 For	2011	our	BEDS	model	projects	that	26.7%	of	firms	(weighted	by	employment)	will	still	have	2011	taxable	
payroll	below	their	FY2009	level	and	will	therefore	not	be	able	to	benefit	from	the	JCTC.	The	JCTC	is	10%	in	2011,	
so	the	predicted	impact	of	the	JCTC	is	1.825%	(0.30	*	0.10	*	0.83	*	(1-0.267)).
What if the labor demand response is lower?
Our model can be easily tweaked to change assumptions. We report below results after lowering the labor demand as-
sumption to what Hamermesh identifies as the “lower bound” of estimates: 0.15. 
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Table a-C
economic costs and benefits of the JCTC using a 0.15 labor elasticity of demand
2010 2011
(1) Number of jobs induced by the credit (thousands) 1,420 1,128
(2) Number of credited jobs not induced by the credit (thousands) 14,581 19,555
 
(3) Cost of credits for jobs induced by the credit (millions) $9,126 $4,834
(4) Cost of credits for jobs not induced by the credit (millions) 83,520 77,952
(5) Corporate and personal tax revenue gained from non-induced jobs 
(millions)
21,933 20,471
(6) Gross cost of the credit (Row 3 + Row 4 - Row 5, millions) $70,713 $62,316
(7) Increase in GDP induced by the credit (millions) $87,655 $69,649
(8) Effect of rising GDP on the budget deficit (millions) -33,309 -26,467
(9) Estimated rise in revenue from the credit (millions) $25,814 $20,512
(10) Net revenue costs of the credit (millions) 44,899 41,804
(11) Estimated reduction in spending from the credit (millions) $-7,494 $-5,955
(12) Net fiscal costs of the credit (Row 6 - Row 9 + Row 11 millions) 37,404 35,849
(13) Net fiscal cost of the credit per job created (Row 12/Row 1) $26,344 $31,776
SouRcE: Authors’ analysis, using data sources and methods as described in the text.
 Before providing these lower-bound estimates, we should note that the baseline assumptions given above for 
labor demand responses seem reasonable. It is quite possible that actual labor demand responses will be greater than 
the	baseline,	rather	than	less.	However,	it	seems	prudent	to	consider	some	downside	risks	of	a	revised	JCTC	under	
pessimistic assumptions. 
 A labor demand elasticity of 0.15 rather than 0.3 results in job creation that is roughly half as large (compare the 
results in Table A-C and	the	results	in	Table	1).	However,	creating	almost	1.5	million	jobs	in	2010	would	hardly	be	a	
trivial effect. A lower demand elasticity also reduces the program’s costs a bit as fewer employer expansions are spurred 
by	the	wage	credits.	The	cost	reduction	is	about	10%,	to	$72	billion	in	2010	and	$64	billion	in	2011.	
 After considering the effects of GDP increases on the budget deficit, the estimated 2010 net fiscal costs of the 
program	are	$37	billion	and	the	estimated	2011	net	fiscal	costs	are	$36	billion.	The	net	costs	of	the	program	per	job	
created	are	much	higher	than	under	the	0.3	scenario	but	still	modest:	under	$27,000	in	2010	and	under	$32,000	in	
2011.	Appendix	F	shows	that	the	net	costs	of	a	JCTC	this	high	are	worth	pursuing	given	the	estimated	social	benefits	
of job creation. 
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appendix D:  
administrative design
There	are	two	principal	goals	for	administrative	design	of	a	JCTC.	First,	the	credit	should	be	simple:	easy	for	employers	
to understand, easy for employers who are actually expanding payroll to claim, and easy for the Internal Revenue Service 
to	administer.	Second,	the	credit	should	be	stringent:	it	should	be	difficult	for	employers	to	claim	the	credit	unless they 
are actually expanding employment and payroll. 
 An economist is probably not the best person to design the administrative details of such a tax credit. Better advice 
might be received by a committee of business tax accountants and federal tax administrators. However, here are our sug-
gestions for such a committee to consider. 
Filing
As previously suggested by Bishop (2008, 2009), one possibility is to base the wage credit on quarterly tax filings made 
by	almost	all	employers	on	Form	941.	Total	Social	Security	wages	are	reported	by	the	employer	on	lines	5a	and	5b.	These	
are	wages	paid	to	all	employees	up	to	the	employees’	maximum	Social	Security-taxed	annual	earnings	of	$106,800.
Credit base
We propose primarily basing the credit on the increase in Social Security wages. This keeps the full wage credit for al-
most all employees but reduces any credits for extremely high-paid employees (including, for example, the owner of the 
business). Further, we suggest that the wage filings for each quarter be compared with the analogous quarter of the base 
period. If a credit is passed in the fourth quarter of 2009, the base period would be the fourth quarter of 2008 through 
the third quarter of 2009. Using the same quarter of the base period has several advantages. 
 First, it automatically adjusts for seasonal variations in employment. We don’t want to provide credits for employers 
who normally expand employment every summer, or during the Christmas season. In addition, if the employer has a 
high percentage of highly paid employees, paid more than the Social Security maximum, then Social Security–covered 
wages will tend to dip in the fourth quarter of each year (or whenever the Social Security maximum covered annual 
wages and exceeded). By comparing wages paid in each quarter of 2010 and 2011 with the analogous quarter of the base 
period, the calculation automatically adjusts for this tax-related “seasonality” of reported Social Security wages. 
 Wages paid to the owners or family members would not be counted toward the credit.
 Finally, we would propose one additional constraint. Employers could receive a wage credit only if their employment 
was	not	reduced	compared	to	the	base	quarter.	(This	could	also	be	measured	using	information	from	Form	941,	specifi-
cally the information on line 1 on the number of employees for the pay period including the 12th day of the last month 
of the quarter.) We want to provide incentives for hours increases as well as net additions to employment. However, we 
do not wish to provide the credit to employers who may increase payroll by increasing work hours while cutting the 
number of employees. 
Adjustments to the base
We suggest that the adjustment factor for base period wages be based on the annual adjustment customarily used for 
maximum	Social	Security	taxed	wages.	This	adjustment	was	4.7%	from	2008	to	2009.	This	adjustment	in	most	years	
reflects changes in average worker wages. We only want to pay credits for payroll increases that go beyond what would 
be expected if employers’ keep the same employment and work hours, and simply increase wages with average wages. 
We also don’t want to pay credits for increases in wages covered by Social Security that are simply due to adjustments in 
Social Security rules for maximum Social Security-taxed wages. 
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 We note that Social Security freezes maximum Social Security-taxed wages if the Social Security cost-of-living-
adjustment is not increasing. Under current projections, it is possible that maximum Social Security taxable wages 
will not increase in 2010 and 2011. (See The 2009 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance, pp. 105-108.) In that case, there would be no need to adjust base 
period wages.
 
appendix e:  
General equilibrium effects  
of a wage credit for expanding employment
In a depressed economy, a wage credit for expanding employment will have economic impacts over and above the direct 
jobs	created.	To	start,	even	if	aggregate	national	output	were	unchanged	by	the	credit,	the	credit	would	still	encourage	
greater employment by increasing the average labor-to-output ratio in the economy. Given that fears of a “jobless recov-
ery,” wherein output rises but employment does not, are now (correctly) high, this channel alone could have a nontrivial 
impact on job growth.
 Furthermore, there are several reasons to think that wage credits will indeed lead to increased aggregate output. First, 
the credits will tend to lower prices, which will expand aggregate demand. Second, the increase in the labor-to-output 
ratio with wage credits will increase the ratio of worker earnings (which include the wage credits) to output. If (as is 
likely) the marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is higher than out of other kinds of income (especially 
profits), then this increase in the wage share will increase aggregate demand for output. It should also be noted that 
any initial increase in aggregate output will tend to have Keynesian multiplier effects by increasing incomes, which will 
increase consumer demand. We don’t model these Keynesian re-spending effects in our estimates, which make them 
quite conservative. Therefore, the general equilibrium response of overall employment to lower wages brought about by 
wage credits will tend to expand aggregate employment both by increasing the labor-to-output ratio and by expanding 
aggregate output. 
 Bartik (2001) has shown that these labor demand effects will interact with labor supply to yield the final effect of 
wage credits. He finds that the labor demand effects will dominate and drive the overall results in high-unemployment 
economies, such as the one characterizing the United States today. 
 
appendix f:  
How much is an additional job worth  
in today’s economy?
Adding	jobs	to	the	economy	provides	the	monetary	benefits	of	these	jobs’	compensation.	This	averages	about	$62,000	in	
today’s American economy. In addition, moving from involuntary unemployment to employment provides an improved 
sense of self-worth for the individual worker that goes beyond the earnings gained. This improved sense of self-worth 
corresponds to a high monetary value of obtaining a job. 
	 For	example,	research	by	Blanchflower	and	Oswald	(2004)	shows	that	“to	‘compensate’	men	exactly	for	unemploy-
ment	would	take	a	rise	in	income	of	[approximately	$79,000]	per	annum	[in	2008	dollars].”	This	figure	is	derived	by	
measuring how much unemployment affects reported happiness compared to how much income affects reported happi-
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ness. This effect of unemployment on happiness holds income constant, so it represents the benefits of the social mean-
ing of jobs that go beyond the earnings they bring.3 Moving from employment to involuntary unemployment ranks 
among life’s major traumatic events. It is close to the adverse effects brought about by being widowed or experiencing a 
marital	separation,	which	are	valued	at	over	$130,000.4
	 Why	might	moving	from	unemployment	to	employment	have	such	great	social	value?	In	part	because	of	the	social	
importance attached to jobs in modern American society. But also, obtaining a job may provide employment experience 
that may affect a worker’s long-run job skills, employment rate, and wages. 
 Nobel Prize-winning economist Edmund Phelps eloquently stated the case for the long-term importance of jobs 
in	1972:	
“Of	[the	changes	caused	by	a	boom],	job	experience,	with	its	opportunities	for	learning	by	doing	and	on-the-job	
training, is possibly the most important. When people are engaged in sustained work of a kind with which they 
have not had any similar experience, they become different for it in a number of ways that are relevant for the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Getting to work on time is just about the most important habit a worker can 
have in nearly every kind of job.... For many of the people who comprise the hard-core, most frequently unem-
ployed group, getting to be reliable and learning to work with other people are necessary attributes for continua-
tion in the job….For other people, the opportunity to acquire skills at more demanding jobs in the skill hierarchy 
than they could ordinarily qualify for under normal always-equilibrium aggregate demand behavior may be the 
more important aspect....The upgrading of many workers that results from a disequilibrating rise of aggregate 
demand	may	gradually	lead	to	a	true	upgrading	in	the	average	quality	of	the	labor	force.”	(Phelps	1972,	79)
 Further, reducing unemployment is valuable even to those who remain employed. Reducing the local unemploy-
ment rate reduces the risk to the employed of becoming unemployed. It also reduces the unemployment of persons 
important to the employed, such as their family, friends, and neighbors. 
	 Research	(Tella,	MacCulloch,	and	Oswald	2001)	has	shown	that,	while	the	effect	of	a	one-point	rise	in	unemploy-
ment in reducing life satisfaction is greater per person for the unemployed than for the employed (by about 15 times), 
because there are many more employed persons than unemployed the aggregate “social cost” of rising unemployment is 
as much as six times as large as the simple loss to those who lose their jobs. 
 The upshot of all this discussion is that creating a job in a high unemployment economy might easily have a social 
benefit	of	$60,000	or	$100,000	per	job,	or	even	much	more.	This	social	benefit	is	in	addition	to	the	earnings	gained	
from the job. It reflects future earnings gained due to extra job experience, the social meaning of employment in Ameri-
can society, and the value of reducing overall unemployment rates to the employed. 
 We note that such social benefits are much higher in a high-unemployment economy. Therefore, the job creation tax 
credit that we propose is a temporary tax credit that is appropriate in today’s high-unemployment economy.  It would 
not be appropriate as a permanent tax credit that would persist in low-unemployment conditions. 
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appendix G:  
federal vs. state job creation tax credits
Some states also have employer tax credits that purport to create jobs. These frequently are permanent tax credits. Do the 
arguments	we	have	made	for	a	temporary	federal	JCTC	apply	to	all	of	these	state-level	credits?
Not necessarily, for several reasons:
•		 Many state-level tax credits are poorly designed. The credits may not be tightly targeted at job creation, or may 
be haphazardly distributed to employers.
•		 State balanced-budget requirements restrict the effectiveness of such credits. Unlike the federal government, 
states must finance a job creation tax credit by reducing spending or increasing other taxes. Such measures at least 
partially	offset	any	economic	benefits	of	a	JCTC,	and	may	create	other	social	costs.
•		 A permanent statewide JCTC may not have sufficient social benefits to justify its costs. As discussed in Appen-
dix F, the social benefits of creating jobs are much higher when and where unemployment is high.
•		 State competition for jobs may be a zero-sum or negative-sum game.	A	state	JCTC	may	attract	jobs	away	from	
another state with a more depressed economy. 
appendix H: explaining the model
This technical appendix explains our model estimating the impact of wage credits for expanding employment. This 
model is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet, available on request from the authors. A table version of the spreadsheet 
is presented here (Table A-H). We go through this table line-by-line to explain how the numbers are obtained. The top 
numbers are the inputs for the model. These inputs are obtained from various data sources or reasonable estimates.
Item 1	is	wage	and	salary	earnings,	excluding	federal	employees,	in	the	United	States	in	2008,	obtained	from	Table	6.3D	
of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) produced by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Item 2	is	full-time	equivalent	(FTE)	employment,	excluding	federal	employees,	in	the	U.S.	in	2008,	from	Table	6.5D	
of NIPA. 
Item 3	is	wages	and	salaries	per	FTE	employee,	derived	by	dividing	Item	1	by	Item	2.	
Item 4	is	compensation	per	FTE	non-federal	employee,	derived	from	NIPA	Tables	6.2d	and	6.5d.	
Item 5 is the default percentage (without the wage credit) of total private baseline employment represented by private 
jobs created by openings and expansions over a one-year period. This number is needed to estimate the cost of the credit 
that goes to jobs that would’ve been created even in its absence It is derived from the Business Employment Dynamics 
(BED) database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). BLS reports annual jobs created by openings and expansions of 
establishments,	as	a	percentage	of	one-year-ago	employment,	from	the	first	quarter	of	2007	to	the	first	quarter	of	2008.	
This	number	can	be	found	in	Annual	Table	2	of	the	Business	Employment	Dynamics	data,	which	can	be	accessed	at:	
http://www.bls.gov/bdm/anntab2_1.txt. 
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Item 6 is the ratio of employment created in openings and expansions over a two-year period (from 2009 to 2011) as a 
percentage of baseline employment to this percentage over a single year. This ratio is our best estimate in the absence of 
data. If one-year percentage growth numbers are the same over time, the maximum value for this parameter is two. In 
general, it will be less than two, because some of the firms that opened or expanded in the first year will close or contract 
in the second year, and vice versa. 
Item 7	 is	 the	 ratio	 of	 Social	 Security	wages	 to	 total	wages.	This	 is	 derived	 from	Tax	Policy	Center	 figures	 for	 how	
much would be raised from eliminating the maximum taxable wage cap on Social Security (see http://www.tax-
policycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?DocID=1816	 and	 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.
cfm?Docid=46&Topic2id=50).	This	ratio	is	used	to	reduce	credit	costs,	as	only	wages	up	to	the	Social	Security	cap	are	
assumed to receive a wage credit.
Item 8 is the assumed labor demand elasticity. It is assumed to be 0.3 in the baseline simulation, based on Hamermesh 
(1993, 135). In Appendix C, we use the lower-bound value identified by Hamermesh (0.15) to model a “pessimistic” 
scenario for the wage credit.
Item 9 is the proportion of the wage credit that is immediately recaptured by higher taxes on business profits. It is only 
calculated for wage credits paid to job creation that would have occurred without the wage credit. Item 9 reflects that the 
wage credit directly raises a private for-profit employer’s profits, which will also raise its taxes. The question is what tax 
rate to use for this calculation. After some reflection, we rejected using effective business tax rates, as these typically are 
calculated for capital expansions financed by some combination of debt and equity. In contrast, here we are considering a 
wage credit that is largely assumed to not affect capital, but only to induce employment expansion. Therefore, it seemed 
appropriate	to	use	the	actual	statutory	rate	faced	by	the	business	owners.	We	used	the	top	corporate	tax	rate	of	35%	for	
corporate	profits,	and	the	top	individual	tax	rate	of	27%	for	non-corporate	profits.	A	weighted	average	was	calculated	of	
three	possible	tax	rates:	35%	for	corporate	profits;	27%	for	non-corporate	profits;	zero	for	non-profit	organizations	and	
state and local governments. The weights used in this calculation were the proportion of wages and salaries of each of 
these	sectors	in	non-federal	wages	and	salaries,	calculated	using	Tables	6.3d	and	1.13	of	NIPA.	
Item 10 is the proportion of total non-federal employment that is assumed to be potentially affected by the wage credit 
during the first year, 2010. This is based on one minus the proportion of private establishments that contract or close 
during a one year period. That is, the proportion that is calculated is the proportion of establishments that either stay the 
same,	open,	or	expand	during	a	one-year	period.	These	data	are	obtained	from	Table	4	of	the	annual	growth	data	from	
the	Business	Employment	Dynamics	database,	available	at	http://www.bls.gov/bdm/anntab4_1.txt.
 This calculation implicitly assumes that the employment that is potentially affected is proportional to the private 
establishments that are potentially affected. This may not be perfectly accurate because firms are not the same as estab-
lishments, because firms and establishments of different sizes may have different probabilities of growing or contracting, 
and because the average experience of all non-federal employment may not be the same as that of private employment. 
Item 11 is the proportion of total non-federal employment that is assumed to be potentially affected by the wage credit 
during the second year, 2011. This proportion will be larger than the proportion in the first year. During the second year, 
employers that opened up or expanded during the first year will be potentially affected by the credit, even if they would 
have contracted without the credit during the second year, as their employment decisions during the second year poten-
tially will affect the credit they receive. The credit received is based on payroll and employment relative to the base year 
of	2009,	rather	than	relative	to	2010.	To	calculate	this	proportion,	we	assume	that	only	establishments	that	contracted	
during the first year would not be affected by the wage credit. 
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Item 12 is the ratio of the dollar reduction in the budget deficit to a given dollar increase in gross domestic product 
(GDP).	These	data	are	derived	from	U.S.	Congressional	Budget	Office	data	on	the	cyclical	component	of	the	budget	
deficit	and	data	on	potential	versus	actual	GDP.	We	obtained	these	data	for	fiscal	years	1969	to	2008	in	Tables	F-11	
and	F-12	from	a	Congressional	Budget	Office	Excel	workbook	titled	“Historicaltables09jun09web.xls,”	and	they	are	
downloadable from “Historical Budget Data” link at the Web page for “A Preliminary Analysis of the President’s Bud-
get and an Update to CBO’s Budget and Economic Outlook” (March 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.
cfm?index=10014.	
 We updated this to include fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011. For cyclical dollar effects on the budget deficit, data 
were	obtained	from	a	table	labeled	“6-23	BusinessCycleTables.xls,”	available	as	the	data	accompanying	the	June	2009	re-
port, “Measuring the Effects of the Business Cycle on the Federal Budget.” Potential GDP data for fiscal years 2009, 2010, 
and	2011	were	obtained	from	Table	1	of	the	June	2009	report.	Predicted	actual	GDP	data	for	fiscal	years	2009,	2010,	and	
2011	were	obtained	from	Table	A-2	of	an	Excel	spreadsheet	from	CBO	labeled	“Econ_ProjAug09.xls,”	available	as	the	
Economic Projections Excel spreadsheet from the CBO publication, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update.”
 We use a median value of 0.38 for this economic output effect on the budget deficit. This should not be interpreted 
as just reflecting marginal tax effects. It includes tax effects in increased tax revenues as well as effects in reduced unem-
ployment compensation and other safety net programs
Item 13	is	the	assumed	tax	credit	percentage	for	2010	of	15%.	
Item 14	is	the	assumption	that	the	tax	credit	percentage	for	2011	will	be	two-thirds	as	great,	at	10%.
Items 15 through 23 use these data and behavioral and policy assumptions to predict the effects of the wage credit. 
Item 15 is predicted wage credit costs for the openings and expansions that would have occurred even without the wage 
credit. This is derived by multiplying total non-federal wages and salaries by the percentage openings and expansions are 
of base employment over a one-year period times the tax credit percentage. This is then downweighted by multiplying 
the wage credit percentage times the ratio of Social Security wages to total wages, as the wage credit only applies to Social 
Security wages. The cost is also downweighted by the wage credits that will directly lead to higher tax revenues from 
business profits, even if the tax credit has no behavioral effects.
Item 16 is the employment increase estimated to occur due to the wage credit. This multiplies total base employment 
times the assumed percentage of employment that is responsive to the credit times the tax credit percentage times the 
assumed elasticity of labor demand. There is downweighting of the effects by multiplying this expression by the ratio of 
wages to compensation: the assumption is that the demand elasticity reflects a responsiveness to percentage changes in 
compensation, and since the wage credit is a percentage of wages, its percentage effect on compensation will be smaller. 
Item 17 is the wage credit costs for these induced jobs in item 16. This multiplies the number of induced jobs times 
average wages per job times the ratio of Social Security wages to total wages times the wage credit percentage. 
Item 18 totals the wage credit costs for the first year by adding up wage credit costs for induced jobs, and for jobs that 
would have been created without the credit. 
Item 19 calculates the ratio of wage credit costs to induced jobs, which divides estimated costs in item 18 by estimated 
jobs	created	in	item	17.	This	is	one	measure	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	wage	credits.	
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Item 20 is an alternative measure of effectiveness. It calculates total jobs that receive wage credits, divided by jobs actually 
induced by the wage credits. The number of jobs directly induced by the credits has already been reported at item 16. 
The number of other jobs that receive credits is calculated by multiplying total baseline jobs by the assumed percentage 
of jobs created by openings and expansions.
	 It	is	interesting	that	the	tax	credit	costs	per	job	created	are	modest,	at	$28,116,	even	though	less	than	one	in	five	jobs	
that receives credits is actually induced by the wage credit. This program does not need to have a very high hit rate to be 
successful.
Item 21 calculates the reduction in the budget deficit due to the induced jobs. This multiplies the increase in GDP times 
the negative of the ratio of the budget deficit effect to GDP, from CBO. The increase in GDP is calculated by multiply-
ing the induced jobs by average compensation per job. The implicit assumption is that capital is held constant. If we 
assumed capital investment also changed in response to the wage credit, the effect on GDP would be much greater. 
Item 22 calculates the net costs of the wage credit program, including the effects of the program itself with no behavior 
effects, and the effects due to the program’s effects in increasing GDP. Item 23 divides this net cost by the number of jobs 
created to get a net cost per job created number.
Items 24 through 32 do similar calculations for the second-year numbers. All the calculations are analogous, except 
some of the numbers used are updated for the second year. For example, the measure of costs for growth that would have 
occurred	anyway,	in	item	24,	compared	to	item	15,	the	percentage	of	openings	and	closing	over	the	two-year	period	is	
larger, which tends to increase costs. But also the percentage wage credit is assumed to be lower, which reduces costs. 
For the induced employment increase for the second year, item 25, compared to the same concept for the first year (item 
16), a higher percentage of employment is assumed affected, which drives up the employment effect, but the wage credit 
percentage is lowered, which reduces the employment effect. Similar adjustments are made to the other calculations in 
items	24	through	32.
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Endnotes
1. Other policies should also be adopted to boost job growth, chief among them extensions of many of the provisions of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act. These include policies to boost demand, including extending public relief programs such as unemployment insurance 
and food stamps. In addition, increased direct aid to states would help prevent layoffs of public employees, which would ripple through local 
economies and destroy private sector jobs as well.
2. These are responses to permanent wage changes. We might expect responses to temporary wage changes brought about by a wage credit to 
be smaller. On the other hand, the labor demand responses estimated by Hamermesh are really responses of labor demand holding the firm’s 
output constant, or, in other words, they are changes in the labor/output ratio. Wage credits would be expected to increase both desired labor 
and desired output of an employer.
3.	 What	about	the	value	of	foregone	leisure?	This	may	be	relevant	when	considering	an	economy	with	low	unemployment.	However,	we	are	here	
referring to involuntary unemployment. We note that the high valuations on moving between unemployment and employment estimated by 
researchers on happiness determinants are net of any valuation of leisure.
4.	 These	valuations	rest	on	comparing	how	happiness	is	affected	by	small	marginal	changes	in	income	with	the	effects	of	discrete	changes	such	as	
becoming unemployed or widowed. Individuals may not be willing to pay the full amount implied by these valuations for a discrete change 
from unemployment to employment. However, collectively a group of individuals may be willing to pay relatively small marginal valuations 
to reduce the risk of one of them becoming unemployed, and these collective small valuations might sum to these large aggregate valuations 
of	reducing	unemployment	by	one	person.	If	these	valuations	are	valid,	why	don’t	individuals	further	bid	down	wages?	Among	other	factors,	
part of the social value of a job may be associated with the job paying a wage perceived as fair and normal.
References
Akerlof, George, and Robert Shiller. 2009. Animal Spirits. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Bartik,	Timothy	J.	2001.	Jobs for the Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies Help? New York, N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation.
Bernstein,	Jared,	and	Lawrence	Mishel.	2008.	“Reading	the	Vital	Signs	in	the	Jobs	Report.”	Issue	Brief	No.	243.	Washington,	D.C.:	
Economic Policy Institute.
Bishop,	John,	and	Robert	Haveman.	1979.	“Selective	Employment	Subsidies:		Can	Okun’s	Law	Be	Repealed?”	American	Economic	
Review	Papers	and	Proceedings,	May:	124-30.
Bishop,	John	H.	1981.	“Employment	in	Construction	and	Distribution	Industries:	The	Impact	of	the	New	Jobs	Tax	Credit.”	In	
Sherwin Rosen, ed., Studies in Labor Markets. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
Bishop,	John	H.	2008.	“Can	a	Tax	Credit	for	Employment	Growth	in	2009	and	2010	Restore	Animal	Spirits	and	Help	Jump	Start	
the	Economy?”	Cornell	University	ILR	School.	Available:	http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/184/	(accessed:	30	Septem-
ber 2009).
Bishop,	John	H.	2009.	“How	to	Restore	Animal	Spirits	and	Reduce	Unemployment:	A	Tax	Credit	for	Employment	Growth	in	
Fiscal	2010	and	2011.”	Cornell	University	ILR	School.	Available:	http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/242/	(accessed:	30	
September 2009).
Blanchflower,	David	G.,	and	Andrew	J.	Oswald.	2004.	Well-being	over	time	in	Britain	and	the	USA.	Journal of Public Economics, 
88: 1359-86.
Hamilton,	James	D.	2003.	What	is	an	oil	shock?	Journal of Econometrics, 113(2):363-98.
Hamilton,	James	D.	2009.	“Causes	and	Consequences	of	the	Oil	Shock	of	2007-08.”	Paper	presented	at	Brookings	Institution,	
Washington,	D.C.,	April	27.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1993. Labor Demand. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Perloff,	Jeffrey	J.,	and	Michael	L.	Wachter.	1979.	The	new	jobs	tax	credit:	An	evaluation	of	the	1977–78	wage	subsidy	program.	
American Economic Review,	69(2):	173–79.
Phelps,	Edmund.	1972.	Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory. New York, N.Y.: Norton.
Tella,	Rafael	Di,	Robert	J.	MacCulloch,	and	Andrew	J.	Oswald.	2001.	Preferences	over	inflation	and	unemployment:	Evidence	from	
surveys of happiness. American Economic Review,	91(1):	335-41.
